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INTRODUCTION 
Justice Antonin Scalia once opined that 
the dissent does not discuss a single case—not one—in which it is clear that 
a person was executed for a crime he did not commit. If such an event had 
 
            *  Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. I wish to thank Sarah 
Murphy of the class of 2020 and Vasundhara Prasad of the class of 2019 for their 
valuable assistance. 
 1. Myrna S. Raeder, See No Evil: Wrongful Convictions and the 
Prosecutorial Ethics of Offering Testimony by Jailhouse Informants and Dishonest 
Experts, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1413, 1419 (2007) (quoting Leslie Vernon White, a 
jailhouse informant who appeared on 60 Minutes in February 1989 and admitted to 
multiple acts of lying as an informant). 
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occurred in recent years, we would not have to hunt for it; the innocent’s 
name would be shouted from the rooftops by the abolition lobby.2  
Well, allow me to shout the name of Cameron Todd Willingham 
(Willingham) from the rooftops. 
On December 23, 1991, three young girls were burned alive in 
their Corsicana, Texas, home.3 Willingham, the girls’ own father, was 
charged with arson and murder.4 To avoid the death penalty, lawyers 
advised Willingham to accept a plea deal whereby he would plead 
guilty and serve a life in prison sentence.5 However, Willingham 
refused to accept the plea deal, stating, “I ain’t gonna plead to 
something I didn’t do, especially killing my own kids.”6 He was 
convicted in August 1992 and sentenced to death.7 He was executed 
in February 2004.8 
Willingham’s conviction was supported by expert witness 
testimony in arson and by a prison informant’s testimony.9 During the 
trial, however, the experts’ testimony of arson was largely discredited 
because of the reliance on questionable science.10 In response to a 
clemency petition shortly before the execution, the prosecutor, John 
Jackson, argued that the testimony of prison inmate Johnny E. Webb 
 
 2. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 188 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 3. See David Grann, Trial By Fire: Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man?, 
THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 7, 2009), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/ 
2009/09/07/trial-by-fire [https://perma.cc/46ZA-4T7U]. 
 4. See id. 
 5. See id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See id. 
 10. The prosecution proffered two seasoned experts who were considered 
“old school” investigators. They relied on intuition and rules of thumb to determine 
whether a fire was a result of arson. Paul C. Gianelli, Junk Science and the Execution 
of an Innocent Man, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 221, 225 (2013). The arson experts 
“relied on old wives’ tales and junk science to send men to prison, and perhaps even 
the death chamber, top experts on fire behavior say.” Christy Hoppe, Some Experts 
Question Science in Texas Arson Cases, CHARLESTON GAZETTE & DAILY MAIL, Sept. 
20, 2009, at 11A. Exemplifying the imprecise nature of an arson investigation, one of 
the experts, Manuel Vasquez, stated that “[t]he fire tells a story. I am just the 
interpreter. . . . And the fire does not lie. It tells me the truth.” CRAIG L. BEYLER, 
ANALYSIS OF THE FIRE INVESTIGATION METHODS AND PROCEDURES USED IN THE 
CRIMINAL ARSON CASES AGAINST ERNEST RAY WILLIS AND CAMERON TODD 
WILLINGHAM 49 (2009).  
 What Jurors Should Know About Informants 347 
was enough to override the questionable arson evidence for the court 
to deny the petition of clemency.11 
Mr. Webb told the jury that he communicated with Willingham 
through a food slot while passing by his cell.12 He claimed that though 
Willingham had repeatedly told him that the fire was an accident, there 
was one interaction where Willingham spontaneously confessed to 
setting the fire.13 According to Webb, Willingham set the fire to hide 
the injuries that his wife, Stacy, had inflicted on one of his daughters.14 
However, the autopsies revealed no evidence of bruises or other signs 
of trauma on the children’s bodies.15 
At the arson trial, Jackson asked Webb during his direct 
testimony, “Johnny, have I ever promised you anything in return for 
your testimony in this case?”16 Webb replied, “No sir, you haven’t.”17 
Jackson then asked, “As a matter of fact, I told you there was nothing 
I can do for you.”18 Webb responded, “You said there was nothing no 
one can do for me.”19 
Mr. Webb had been using drugs since he was nine years old and 
had an extensive criminal record, including car theft, forgery, and 
robbery.20 During the arson trial, Webb testified that he was sexually 
assaulted in prison in 1988 and suffered from post-traumatic stress 
disorder, for which he was taking antidepressants.21 On cross-
examination, he had no memory of the robbery charge he had pleaded 
guilty to only a month earlier.22  
 
 11. See John Schwartz, Evidence of Concealed Jailhouse Deal Raises 
Questions About a Texas Execution, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/28/us/evidence-of-concealed-jailhouse-deal-
raises-questions-about-a-texas-execution.html?_r=2 [https://perma.cc/H83C-ZA2G].  
 12. See Maurice Possley, The Prosecutor and the Snitch, THE MARSHALL 
PROJECT (Aug. 3, 2014) [hereinafter The Prosecutor and the Snitch], 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2014/08/03/did-texas-execute-an-innocent-man-
willingham [https://perma.cc/H83C-ZA2G]. 
 13. See id. 
 14. See id. 
 15. See id. 
 16. Maurice Possley, Fresh Doubts Over a Texas Execution, WASH. POST 
(Aug. 3, 2014) [hereinafter Fresh Doubts Over a Texas Execution], 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2014/08/03/fresh-doubts-over-a-texas-
execution/?utm_term=.f7d0c25f0aa6 [https://perma.cc/SHX9-W6GX].  
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See Grann, supra note 3.  
 21. See The Prosecutor and the Snitch, supra note 12. 
 22. See id.  
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Mr. Webb recanted his testimony against Willingham on several 
occasions, claiming that Jackson had threatened a life sentence for his 
robbery charge unless he testified against Willingham.23 “I did not 
want to see Willingham go to death row and die for something I damn 
well knew was a lie and something I didn’t initiate,” Webb said.24 “I 
lied on the man because I was being forced by John Jackson to do 
so . . . I succumbed to pressure when I shouldn’t have. In the end, I 
was told, ‘you’re either going to get a life sentence or you’re going to 
testify.’ He coerced me to do it.”25 
Despite Jackson’s claims that he did not promise any benefits to 
Mr. Webb in exchange for his testimony, Jackson’s actions appear to 
tell a different story.26 In a previously undisclosed letter that Webb 
wrote from prison in 1996, Webb urged Jackson to make good on an 
earlier promise to downgrade his conviction.27 Webb also hinted that 
he might make his complaint public.28 Within days of receiving the 
letter, Jackson sought out the Navarro County judge who had handled 
Willingham’s case and came away with a court order that altered the 
record of Webb’s robbery conviction to make him immediately 
 
 23. See Maurice Possley, Doubts from Death Row, THE MARSHALL PROJECT 
(Mar. 9, 2014) [hereinafter Doubts from Death Row], 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/03/09/doubts-from-death-
row#.hIPGtWW8P [https://perma.cc/B69N-78BB]. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id.  
 26. Two months after Willingham’s trial, a note given to the Navarro County 
clerk informed the clerk how to respond to prison officials who inquired about Webb. 
The note was unsigned but marked “per John Jackson” and provided that Webb was 
convicted of second-degree robbery, not first-degree aggravated robbery, as he had 
just testified in court. Days after the note, Jackson requested that Webb be assigned 
to a medical unit instead of protective custody, thereby placing Webb in “an 
environment that guarantees the smallest risk.” One month later, Jackson sent a letter 
to prison officials noting that Webb had received death threats and requesting that 
Webb be transferred back to the Navarro County Jail. The Prosecutor and the Snitch, 
supra note 12.  
 27. Letter from Johnny E. Webb, Inmate, to John Jackson, Assistant Dist. 
Attorney, Navarro Cty. Tex. (June 24, 1996), https://www.themarshallproject.org/ 
documents/1684125-johnny-webb-letter-june-1996#.erYywHuqP 
[https://perma.cc/GZ73-KFK4] (writing to Jackson that “you had told me that the 
charge of aggravated robbery would be dropped, or lowered” and urging Jackson to 
“review the Judgement of Conviction”). 
 28. See id. (positing to Jackson that he was “unsure whether . . . to file a writ 
of habeus corpus . . . to clarify th[e] matter, or [if Jackson could] take care of it on 
[his] own”). 
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eligible for parole.29 Jackson also wrote numerous letters to prison 
officials, the Board of Pardons and Paroles, and others claiming that 
Webb was a pivotal witness.30 Jackson never informed Willingham’s 
attorney of his efforts to downgrade Webb’s conviction.31 
Accordingly, Jackson faced disciplinary action by the Texas Bar for 
failing to disclose benefits promised to Webb for his testimony.32 
However, after a jury trial, the disciplinary proceeding found no 
misconduct.33 Notably, Webb took the Fifth Amendment at the 
disciplinary proceedings, thereby never substantively testifying 
against Jackson.34  
The story of Webb highlights the need for greater scrutiny with 
regard to informant testimony. Webb, with his criminal record, was 
experienced in the ways of the criminal justice system.35 He was facing 
life in prison for an aggravated robbery, which compelled him to 
testify for the greatest of all incentives: his freedom.36 Moreover, there 
is a strong likelihood that Webb provided false testimony and that 
those lies contributed to Willingham’s execution.37 Interestingly, in 
 
 29. See The Prosecutor and the Snitch, supra note 12. On July 15, 1996, the 
Judge who presided over Willingham’s trial and sentenced Webb to prison in 1992 
entered a new judgment in Webb’s case at the request of Jackson. See id. Webb’s 
crime was officially recorded as second-degree robbery instead of a first-degree 
aggravated robbery, which ultimately reduced the time Webb had to wait before 
seeking parole. See id. 
 30. See id. Following the change of Webb’s record, Jackson sent a letter to 
the Texas parole board saying that he had “recently” become aware that prison records 
mistakenly showed Webb was convicted of aggravated robbery. Id. Claiming to have 
consulted with Webb’s attorney, Jackson wrote that he had obtained a court order to 
change Webb’s record of conviction to the lesser crime of second-degree robbery. See 
id. In a subsequent letter to the parole board, Jackson wrote that Webb had 
“volunteered information and testified . . . without any agreement from the State 
respecting diminution of the recommendation in his own case” and asked that Webb 
be given consideration for his “[c]ooperation in the murder prosecution without 
expectation of leniency.” Id. 
 31. See Maurice Possley, Jury Clears the Prosecutor Who Sent Cameron 
Todd Willingham to Death Row, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (May 11, 2017), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/05/11/jury-clears-the-prosecutor-who-
sent-cameron-todd-willingham-to-death-row [https://perma.cc/BR67-7UD4]. 
 32. See id. 
 33. See id. 
 34. See id. Webb invoked the Fifth Amendment over fifty times and stated 
that he did not recall or did not remember nearly 100 times. Id.  
 35. See The Prosecutor and the Snitch, supra note 12 (noting that Webb had 
previous criminal convictions). 
 36. See id. (discussing Webb’s robbery charge and Jackson’s offer to reduce 
Webb’s sentence should he testify against Willingham). 
 37. See id. (discussing Webb’s discussions with Jackson). 
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2015, Texas—“a minefield of wrongful convictions”—established a 
state commission to investigate and address causes of exoneration.38 
In regard to jail house informants, the Commission highlights the 
significance of maintaining records of conversations with the 
informant.39 The prosecutor should detail the informant’s criminal 
history and whether any benefits have been offered in exchange for 
the informant’s testimony.40 Further, the Commission recommends 
that this information is disclosed to defense counsel.41 
The need for informants has been an important aspect of the 
criminal justice system for many years.42 This is because the 
information provided by informants oftentimes plays a key role in the 
government’s investigation of crimes and ultimate prosecution.43 
Moreover, “[i]nformants have become integral to the success of many 
FBI investigations of organized crime, public corruption, the drug 
trade, counterterrorism, and other initiatives.”44 Our discussion will 
focus on the use of informant testimony at trial. 
Though United States courts have endorsed the use of 
informants, they also have cautioned their use with regard to 
credibility.45 As early as 1952, Justice Robert Jackson opined in Lee v. 
United States that “[t]he use of informers, accessories, accomplices, 
false friends, or any of the other betrayals which are ‘dirty business’ 
may raise serious questions of credibility.”46 Commenting on the use 
 
 38. Editorial Board, Texas Cracks Down on the Market for Jailhouse 
Snitches, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/15/opinion/ 
sunday/texas-cracks-down-on-the-market-for-jailhouse-snitches.html 
[https://perma.cc/BR67-7UD4]. 
 39. See id. (noting that the Texas Legislature accepted the Commission’s 
recommendations by passing a new law). 
 40. See id. 
 41. See id. 
 42. See Jessica A. Roth, Informant Witnesses and the Risk of Wrongful 
Convictions, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 737, 747–49 (2016) (stating that according to 
United States Sentencing Commission data for a seven-year period (2009–2015), 
between 11.2% and 12.5% of defendants received sentencing discounts for providing 
“substantial assistance” in the prosecution of others).  
 43. See generally Clifford S. Zimmerman, Toward a New Vision of 
Informants: A History of Abuses and Suggestions for Reform, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L. 
Q. 81 (1994) (discussing the detrimental impact of untruthful informants). 
 44. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CHAPTER THREE: 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES REGARDING THE USE OF CONFIDENTIAL 
INFORMANTS, in SPECIAL REPORT: THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S INVESTIGATIVE GUIDELINES 63, 65 
(2005). 
 45. See Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 747–57 (1952). 
 46. Id. at 797. 
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of informants, Chief Justice Earl Warren stated, “One of the important 
duties of this Court is to give careful scrutiny to practices of 
government agents when they are challenged in cases before us, in 
order to insure that the protections of the Constitution are respected 
and to maintain the integrity of federal law enforcement.”47 The Ninth 
Circuit opined:  
Never has it been more true than it is now that a criminal charged with a 
serious crime understands that a fast and easy way out of trouble with the 
law is . . . to cut a deal at someone else’s expense and to purchase leniency 
from the government by offering testimony in return for immunity, or in 
return for reduced incarceration.48 
This Article will first explore the problem of wrongful 
convictions resulting in part from false informant testimony. 
Eyewitness exoneration has gotten considerable attention by the 
courts. False informant testimony exoneration has gotten less attention 
than other causes of exoneration.49 We will argue for the use of expert 
witnesses to assist the juries. We will explore the acceptance of expert 
witnesses in eyewitness identification cases. It will be our main 
argument that a similar approach of utilizing expert witnesses should 
be taken with regard to informant testimony. We will then examine 
the acceptance of expert testimony regarding informants using the 
state of Connecticut as an example.50 Finally, we will explore the value 
of the expert testimony regarding informants to demonstrate the 
information the fact finder should know in evaluating the credibility 
of an informant witness. 
I. INFORMANT TESTIMONY EXONERATIONS 
The first DNA exoneration took place in 1989.51 Today, the 
Innocence Project reports 364 DNA exonerations, 17% of which 
involved informants.52 Informants are usually nonexpert witnesses 
who get some benefit from testifying against the defendant.53 Various 
 
 47. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 315 (1966) (Warren, J., dissenting). 
 48. N. Mariana Islands v. Bowie, 243 F.3d 1109, 1123 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 49. See Roth, supra note 42, at 743–44.  
 50. The author has direct experience in testifying in Connecticut as an expert 
witness on factors to consider in weighing the credibility of informants. 
 51. DNA Exonerations in the United States, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
https://www.innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/ 
[https://perma.cc/CCR7-8A7K] (last visited May 16, 2019). 
 52. Id. 
 53. See ROBERT M. BLOOM, RATTING: THE USE AND ABUSE OF INFORMANTS 
IN THE AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM 155 (2002). 
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incentives are provided to informants for testifying, such as monetary 
inducements.54 There are several different types of informants. 
However, studies looking at exoneration focus on two types: an 
incarcerated person, or so-called “jailhouse informant,” and an 
accomplice informant who participated in the defendant’s crime.55 
These informants are looked at most closely because the types of 
benefits offered provide high incentives to provide untruthful 
testimony.56 Specifically, both types of informants may be 
incarcerated and facing criminal sanctions, which incentivizes them to 
cooperate with prosecutors.57 This Article will focus on these two 
types of informants who seek to gain benefits such as elimination or 
reduction of charges, a favorable sentencing recommendation, or, in 
some cases, release from incarceration. “It is difficult to imagine a 
greater motivation to lie than the inducement of a reduced sentence.”58 
Since the introduction of DNA evidence, 364 convicted 
individuals were exonerated by DNA.59 Although many of these 
exonerations have been the result of faulty eyewitness identifications 
(70%), false confessions (28%), or problematic forensics (44%), a 
significant number have been from false informant testimony (17%).60 
In his book, Professor Garrett of the University of Virginia 
studied the initial 250 DNA exonerations.61 He concluded that fifty-
two cases involved, in whole or in part, false informant testimony 
(21%).62 Of the fifty-two cases, twenty-eight utilized jailhouse 
informants and twenty-three utilized codefendants.63 In the jailhouse 
cases, the informant testified to the defendant’s statements.64 In 
analyzing their testimony, Professor Garrett found that “made to 
 
 54. See id. at 1. 
 55. Id. at 63, 95. 
 56. See Robert W. Stewart, Jailhouse Snitches: Trading Lies for Freedom, 
L.A. TIMES (Apr. 16, 1989), http://articles.latimes.com/1989-04-16/news/mn-
2497_1_veteran-jailhouse-informants-jailhouse-snitches [https://perma.cc/3QVD-
Z7KZ] (noting that jailhouse informant Leslie White said, “[t]he motivation to lie is 
too great”). 
 57. See id. 
 58. United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 59. DNA Exonerations in the United States, supra note 51. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE 
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 124 (2011). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id.  
 64. See id.  
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order” statements supported the State’s case.65 He also found that only 
two of the twenty-eight jailhouse informants admitted that they had 
beneficial agreements with the State for their testimony.66 
Interestingly, the other jailhouse informants claimed no explicit 
promises were made, just as Johnny E. Webb did.67 Yet, like Mr. 
Webb, they ultimately received favorable outcomes in their own 
cases.68 Moreover, Professor Garrett found that informants rarely 
admitted they were testifying for any gain, providing that “[s]ome 
informants claimed they were testifying as public-minded citizens.”69 
In looking at the codefendants or accomplices, Professor Garrett 
observed that all twenty-three shifted the blame of the enterprise on to 
the exoneree.70 
In the 2005 Northwestern University Law School study looking 
at 111 death row exonerations, fifty-one of them, or 45.9%, involved, 
in whole or in part, the testimony of informants.71 Though the large 
bulk of the cases involved jailhouse informants, twenty-one of these 
involved accomplices who received benefits in their sentencing.72 In 
addition, Governor George Ryan of Illinois sanctioned a state-wide 
study on defendants who were sentenced to death.73 Ultimately, the 
study concluded that jailhouse informants were a major cause of 
convictions.74 Additional studies have indicated the significant impact 
of confession evidence on the jury.75 In fact, according to one study, 
 
 65. Id. at 124 (explaining that a “made to order” statement is one that is 
“neatly molded to the litigation strategy of the State”).  
 66. See id. at 127. 
 67. See id. at 128. 
 68. See id. 
 69. Id. at 138.  
 70. See id. at 139. 
 71. ROB WARDEN, THE SNITCH SYSTEM: HOW SNITCH TESTIMONY SENT 
RANDY STEIDL AND OTHER INNOCENT AMERICANS TO DEATH ROW 3 (2004). 
 72. See id. at 3–12. 
 73. See George H. Ryan, Report of The Governor’s Commission on Capital 
Punishment 7–8 (2002). 
 74. See id. at 8. 
 75. See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Neuschatz et al., Secondary Confessions, Expert 
Testimony, and Unreliable Testimony, 27 J. POLICE CRIM. PSYCHOL. 179, 188 (2012) 
[hereinafter Secondary Confessions, Expert Testimony, and Unreliable Testimony]. 
The study made use of two experiments. See id. at 181, 185. In the first experiment, 
participants were told that the jailhouse informant had testified previously in zero, 
five, or twenty cases. See id. at 181. In the second experiment, an expert testified about 
the unreliability of informant testimony. See id. at 185. Both experiments found that 
participants who were exposed to informant testimony were significantly more likely 
to return a guilty verdict than those in the control group. See id. at 181, 185–86, 188.  
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informant secondary confession testimony has a greater effect on 
jurors than even eyewitness identifications.76  
A. Eye Witness Identification and Expert Witnesses 
Misidentification tends to be the major cause of DNA 
exonerations.77 Although scientific research historically has backed 
faulty eyewitness identifications, DNA exonerations have transformed 
eyewitness identifications from mere speculation to confirmation.78 
Significant research on eyewitness identification indicates that 
memory does not act like a camera: very often, the eyewitness may be 
inaccurate.79 Further research suggests problems with cross-racial 
identification.80 Nevertheless, as the number of eyewitness 
exonerations increased, courts began to adopt a number of different 
 
 76. See Stacy Ann Wetmore et al., On the Power of Secondary Confession 
Evidence, 20 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 339, 354 (2014). The study made use of three 
experiments. In the first two experiments, participants read a murder trial transcript 
that contained eyewitness identification, informant testimony, and character 
testimony. The experiments demonstrated that informant testimony was the most 
incriminating. In the third experiment, participants read summaries of criminal trials 
that contained a primary confession, a secondary confession (informant testimony), 
eyewitness identification, or none of the above. The primary confessions and 
secondary confessions produced significantly higher conviction rates than the 
eyewitness identification. Overall, the study indicated that informant testimony is a 
potentially dangerous piece of evidence. Id.  
 77. See, e.g., United States v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131, 142 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(opining that eyewitness identification was the cause of DNA exoneration more than 
all other causes combined); see also Garrett, supra note 61, at 279.  
 78. See People v. Norstand, 939 N.Y.S.2d 261, 262 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011); 
Benn v. United States, 978 A.2d 1257, 1257 (D.C. 2009). 
 79. See Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 262–63 (2012) (Sotomayor, 
J., dissenting) (noting that over the past three decades, more than 2,000 studies related 
to eyewitness identification have been published and that the empirical evidence 
demonstrates that eyewitness misidentification is the single greatest cause of wrongful 
convictions in this country). 
 80. See EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT 255–57 (1932) 
(finding that cross-racial misidentifications were one of the most prominent causes of 
erroneous convictions in sixty-five cases); see also Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial 
Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 934, 936 (1984) 
(highlighting considerable evidence that supports the fact that people are generally 
poor at identifying members of a race different from their own). An analysis of data 
from thirty-nine research articles utilizing nearly 5,000 participants found that the 
probability of a mistaken identification is 1.56 times greater when a witness makes an 
other-race identification than when a witness makes a same-race 
identification. Christian A. Meissner & John C. Brigham, Thirty Years of 
Investigating the Own-Race Bias in Memory for Faces: A Meta-Analytic Review, 7 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 3, 15 (2001).  
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approaches to combat the issue and prevent wrongful convictions.81 
For example, some courts utilize procedures for police to follow to 
limit suggestiveness,82 liberally allow for cross-examination, or 
provide extensive jury instructions.83 Another method to ensure that 
jurors are aware of the vagaries of eyewitness identifications is the use 
of expert witnesses to aid the jury in its evaluation of the eyewitness.84  
The primary reason courts are reluctant to allow eyewitness 
experts is because they feel that juries already are perfectly capable of 
determining the problems with eyewitness identifications.85 
Specifically, they believe that the current procedural safeguards—jury 
instructions and cross-examination by defense counsel—are sufficient 
enough for the jury to determine how much credence to give an 
eyewitness identification.86 Thus, an expert would invade the jury’s 
role to determine credibility.87 Notwithstanding, some courts have 
 
 81. See infra notes 82–84 and accompanying text.  
 82. See Roth, supra note 42, at n.20. 
 83. See, e.g., Frazier v. State, 699 S.E.2d 747, 747 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010).  
 84. See Miller v. State, 770 N.E.2d 763, 773–74 (Ind. 2012); Commonwealth 
v. Bastaldo, 32 N.E.3d 873, 876–77 (Mass. 2015); People v. Boone, 91 N.E.3d 1194, 
1201 (N.Y. 2017) (holding that when the identifying witness and defendant are of 
different races and identification is at issue, the jury is entitled to hear information on 
cross-racial identification); State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 877 (N.J. 2011); State 
v. Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457, 458–59 (N.J. 1999); State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 695–
97 (Or. 2012); see also DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW: SOCIAL AND 
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE ISSUES § 8-1.1, at 370 n.3 (2002); Jennifer L. 
Mnookin, Constructing Evidence and Educating Juries: The Case for Modular, 
Made-in-Advance Expert Evidence About Eyewitness Identifications and False 
Confessions, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1811, 1826 (2015); Sandra Guerra Thompson, 
Eyewitness Identifications and State Courts as Guardians Against Wrongful 
Conviction, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 603, 621–31 (2010); George Vallas, A Survey of 
Federal and State Standards for the Admission of Expert Testimony on the Reliability 
of Eyewitnesses, 39 AM. J. CRIM. L. 97, 114–15 (2011) (“Recently . . . [because of the 
exoneration data] there has been a trend in both federal and state courts toward the 
acceptance of expert eyewitness testimony.”). Experts are used to testify in cross-
racial identification cases. See supra note 80 (outlining additional information on 
cross-racial identification).  
 85. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 1105 (6th Cir. 1984) 
(agreeing with the district court that the “jury is fully capable of assessing the 
eyewitness’ ability to perceive and remember” and noting that idea is consistent with 
First Circuit decisions). 
 86. See United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 558–59 (D.C. Cir. 1972) 
(developing a specific set of jury instructions to cover various issues with eyewitness 
identifications, such as distance, lighting, prior exposure to the defendant, and time 
lapse). 
 87. See State v. Guilbert, 49 A.3d 705, 729 (Conn. 2012). 
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specifically held that eyewitness identification is not within the 
knowledge of most jurors.88 
The Wigmore Treatise describes the test for when to use expert 
witnesses as a subjective: “On this subject can a jury receive from this 
person appreciable help?”89 Or, as Professor Allen provided, “[d]oes 
the expert in fact possess knowledge useful to this trial that is being 
brought to bear upon it in a way that increases the probability of 
accurate outcomes?”90 In general, a judge can allow expert testimony 
if it will help the jury understand issues of fact beyond its common 
experience.91 In thinking about an expert, one must ask whether the 
expert would provide the jury with information it otherwise would not 
know.92 However, an expert cannot testify as to the credibility of a 
particular witness, which is within the exclusive province of jurors.93 
Rather, the purpose of an expert witness is to assist jurors on subjects 
it may not know about or may have misconceptions about.94 The expert 
 
 88. See United States v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131, 142 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(“[J]urors seldom enter a courtroom with the knowledge that eyewitness 
identifications are unreliable.”); Newsome v. McCabe, 319 F.3d 301, 305 (7th Cir. 
2003) (“Jurors . . . tend to think that witnesses’ memories are reliable . . . and this gap 
between the actual error rate and the jurors’ heavy reliance on eyewitness testimony 
sets the stage for erroneous convictions.”); United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 
312 n.1, 316 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[T]here is no question that . . . perception and memory 
are not within the common experience of most jurors . . . .”); United States v. Sullivan, 
246 F. Supp. 2d 696, 699 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (finding that expert testimony would 
educate the jury and that “[m]any of the hazards of eyewitness identification are not 
within the ordinary knowledge of most lay jurors”); Commonwealth v. Walker, 92 
A.3d 766, 785–89 (Pa. 2014) (rejecting the long-standing Pennsylvania ban on expert 
testimony for eyewitness reliability and holding that such expert testimony will assist 
the jury); see also Peter A. Joy, Constructing Systemic Safeguards Against Informant 
Perjury, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 677, 683 (2010) (observing that special jury 
instructions are needed to aid the jury in assessing an informant’s credibility); 
Mnookin, supra note 84, at 1812 (noting that judicial acceptance of expert witnesses 
has been growing, even to the point where a trial court’s exclusion of a qualified expert 
who could have educated the jury on the dangers of misidentification was a reversible 
error).  
 89. 7 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1923 (Chadbourn rev. 1978) 
(emphasis in original). 
 90. Mark S. Brodin, Behavioral Science Evidence in the Age of Daubert: 
Reflections of a Skeptic, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 867 n.164 (2005). See also Ronald J. Allen, 
Expertise and the Supreme Court: What is the Problem?, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 
7 (2003). 
 91. See Luna v. Massachusetts, 224 F. Supp. 2d 302, 315 (D. Mass. 2002). 
 92. See State v. Moran, 728 P.2d 248, 251 (Ariz. 1986). 
 93. See id. at 252. 
 94. See id. at 251. 
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can help the jury understand factors that may help it weigh the 
credibility of a witness.95  
Expert testimony . . . is not, as some current practice suggests, a mechanism 
for having someone of elevated education . . . engage in a laying on of the 
hands, placing an imprimatur, upon the justice of one’s cause. . . . Experts 
are not, in theory, called to tell the jury who should win. They are called, 
instead, to provide knowledge to the jury to permit the jury rationally to 
decide the case before it.96 
An eyewitness case from California aptly describes the value of 
an expert witness:  
[E]xpert testimony [on the reliability of eyewitness identification] does not 
seek to take over the jury’s task of judging credibility: . . . [I]t does not tell 
the jury that any particular witness is or is not truthful or accurate in his 
identification . . . . Rather, it informs the jury of certain factors that may 
affect such an identification . . . . The jurors retain both the power and the 
duty to judge the credibility and weight of all the testimony in the case.97 
Similarly, in cases involving informants, an expert witness can raise 
factors about informant testimony to help the jury make an informed 
decision regarding whether to credit the testimony of that witness. 
Certainly, cross-examination and jury instructions contribute to that 
understanding, but it is not enough.98 
Trial judges are given considerable leeway to make the 
determination as to the necessity for expert witnesses and will only be 
overturned if there is an abuse of discretion.99 The judge, in exercising 
her discretion, generally determines two things.100 First, whether the 
expert is truly an expert—does he know what he is talking about?—
and second, whether the information will aid the jury in its 
deliberations.101 In determining the validity of expert testimony, the 
judge also considers whether the jury might afford the expert evidence 
 
 95. See id. 
 96. Id. at 255 n.7 (citing MORRIS K. UDALL & JOSEPH M. LIVERMORE, LAW 
OF EVIDENCE § 22, at 30–31 (2d ed. 1982)). 
 97. People v. McDonald, 27 Cal. 3d 351, 370–71 (Cal. 1984) (emphasis 
removed). 
 98. See State v. Guilbert, 49 A.3d 705, 725–26 (Conn. 2012) (noting that 
cross-examination is better suited to exposing lies than it is for countering sincere but 
mistaken beliefs and concluding that cross-examination and jury instructions are less 
effective than expert testimony in assisting the jury). 
 99. See Brodin, supra note 90, at 899–905 (discussing the role of a trial judge 
in deciding whether jurors need expert guidance and the lack of structural certainty 
involved).  
 100. See id. at 898. 
 101. See id.  
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undue weight.102 This discretion with regard to informants is more 
carefully evaluated when there is limited or no corroborating 
evidence.103 Because appellate courts give a great deal of deference to 
the trial judge’s judgment, it is rare that they reverse this judgment.104  
Often, expert testimony is the best way to aid the jury in its 
evaluation of the eyewitness.105 In one study, expert witnesses’ effects 
on understanding eyewitness identification showed that expert 
witnesses had a greater effect in helping jurors understand and 
improve their sensitivity to eyewitness identification.106 I would 
suggest the same for experts on informant testimony. Studies have 
indicated that jurors do not really understand jury instructions,107 and 
further research is required to determine the effects of such jury 
instructions.108 Jury instructions do not allow jurors to explore the 
information provided.109 They are often reduced to a sentence or two 
 
 102. See id. 
 103. See generally Frazier v. State, 699 S.E.2d 747 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) 
(demonstrating the importance of corroborating evidence in the context of eyewitness 
identifications). In Frazier, the victim was the eyewitness who specifically described 
the defendant in the 911 call, and police officers subsequently located the defendant 
three to four blocks away from the crime scene matching the exact description of the 
eyewitness. See id. at 749–50. This was considered substantial corroborating evidence 
that justified the trial court’s exclusion of the expert’s testimony. See id. at 750.  
 104. See United States v. Rodriguez-Berrios, 573 F.3d 55, 72 (1st Cir. 2009) 
(demonstrating that an appellate court rarely overturns evidence admitted by the trial 
judge).  
 105. See Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical 
Research on Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622, 689 (2000) 
(providing a comprehensive review of empirical research on jury decision making and 
concluding that “expert testimony has more influence when tailored to the specific 
facts of the case at hand” and that juries scrutinize expert testimony “as intensively as 
the testimony of any other witness”); see also Loftus, infra note 106. 
 106. See generally Elizabeth F. Loftus, Impact of Expert Psychological 
Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 65 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 
9 (1980). In the first experiment, “jurors” heard testimony of an eyewitness. Only half 
of the jurors read about expert testimony regarding the reliability of eyewitness 
identification. See id. at 11–13. When expert testimony was read, the researchers 
found that there were fewer convictions. See id. at 12–13. In the second experiment, 
the jurors deliberated on whether to rule in favor or against the defendant. See id. at 
13–14. Jurors who had read about the expert testimony in experiment one discussed 
the eyewitness account for much longer than the jurors who were not exposed to the 
expert testimony. See id. Ultimately, the researchers found that expert testimony may 
help enhance the scrutiny that jurors give to eyewitness accounts. See id. at 14.  
 107. See Russell D. Covey, Abolishing Jailhouse Snitch Testimony, 49 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1375, 1421 n.335 (2014); see also Vallas, supra note 84, at 131. 
 108. See GARRETT, supra note 61, at 251. 
 109. See Sara Gordon, Through the Eyes of Jurors: The Use of Schemas in the 
Application of “Plain-language” Jury Instructions, 64 HASTINGS L. J. 643, 645 
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without sufficient explanation.110 Furthermore, jury instructions 
usually occur at the end of trial, and at that point, jurors are often 
wedded to their positions.111 
Commenting on the ineffectiveness of jury instructions, Justice 
Brennan wrote, “To expect a jury to engage in the collective mental 
gymnastic of segregating and ignoring such [eyewitness] testimony 
upon instruction is utterly unrealistic.”112 Research on jury instructions 
and eyewitness testimony supports that view.113 “However, I would 
suggest that jury instructions are akin to using a Band Aid on a head 
wound: perhaps better than nothing but not the right solution to a 
serious problem.”114 Studies have shown that using both jury 
instructions and expert testimony is the best way to ensure jury 
understanding.115 The issue with relying solely on jury instructions is 
that they come at the end of trial when the majority of jurors have 
already made up their minds.116 Additionally, a judge delivers jury 
instructions in lecture form after live testimony, making it harder for 
jurors to comprehend.117 
 
(noting that “studies have almost universally returned results finding that, by and 
large, jurors are confused by jury instructions and often disregard them”). 
 110. See 1 KEVIN F. O’MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE & 
INSTRUCTIONS §§ 7:02, 7:06 (6th ed. 2008) (noting that standard forms of jury 
instructions “may not be swallowed whole” and recognizing the balance between 
conveying the technicalities of the law while attempting to ensure layperson 
comprehension).  
 111. See id. at § 7:06 (noting that the majority of judges deliver their 
instructions after final arguments); see also Kurt A. Carlson & J. Edward Russo, 
Biased Interpretation of Evidence by Mock Jurors, 7 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 91, 
98 (2001) (finding in a study based on a mock trial that pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant 
attitudes influenced the verdicts of prospective jurors despite instructions to ignore 
prior beliefs). 
 112. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 356 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 113. See Brian L. Cutler et al., The Reliability of Eyewitness Identification: 
The Role of System and Estimator Variables, 11 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 233, 263–64 
(1987). 
 114. Mnookin, supra note 84, at 1838. 
 115. See, e.g., Taki V. Flevaris & Ellie F. Chapman, Cross-Racial 
Misidentification: A Call to Action in Washington State and Beyond, 38 SEATTLE U. 
L. REV. 861, 891 (2015). 
 116. See Loftus, supra note 106, at 9. 
 117. See Note, The Province of the Jurist: Judicial Resistance to Expert 
Testimony on Eyewitnesses As Institutional Rivalry, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2381, 2382 
(2013). 
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B. State Experience: The Connecticut Example 
States have been innovative in amending their criminal 
procedure as they begin to deal with the reasons for exoneration.118 
Connecticut presents a good example of this, as it recently allowed for 
expert testimony for informants in the case State v. Leniart,119 in which 
George Michael Leniart was convicted of murder and capital felony 
in connection with the kidnapping, sexual assault, and murder of a 
teenage victim.120 The body of the victim was never found.121 In his 
appeal from the conviction, the defendant claimed that the evidence 
was insufficient to support his conviction because the only evidence 
of the victim’s death was the testimony of four witnesses who told the 
jury that he had confessed to them about killing the victim and 
disposing of her body.122 Three of these witnesses were inmates with 
whom the defendant previously had been incarcerated.123 At the time 
of his confessions to the inmates, the defendant was incarcerated for 
having sexually assaulted another teenage girl.124 Among the issues on 
appeal was defendant’s claim that the trial court improperly excluded 
from evidence expert witness testimony about the use and effects of 
jailhouse informant testimony.125  
The Appellate Court of Connecticut rendered a decision on the 
issue of expert testimony regarding the use and effects of jailhouse 
informants.126 The defendant argued that he sought to introduce 
evidence that was not within the understanding of an average juror.127 
The State argued that the testimony was within the knowledge of the 
 
 118. See GARRETT, supra note 61, at 241; Michael R. Leippe et al., Timing of 
Eyewitness Expert Testimony, Jurors’ Need for Cognition, and Case Strength as 
Determinants of Trial Verdicts, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 524, 524 (2004). 
 119. See State v. Leniart, 140 A.3d 1026, 1036 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016), cert. 
granted, 150 A.3d 1149 (Conn. 2016), cert. granted, 149 A.3d 499 (Conn. 2016). The 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Connecticut was limited to the issue of whether the 
appellate court properly applied the “corpus delicti rule in concluding that there was 
sufficient evidence to sustain the defendant’s convictions for murder and capital 
felony.” Leniart, 149 A.3d at 499 (Conn. 2016). 
 120. See Leniart, 140 A.3d at 1036–37. 
 121. See id. at 1037. 
 122. See id. 
 123. See id. 
 124. See id. 
 125. See id. at 1036. 
 126. See id. 
 127. See id. at 1071. 
 What Jurors Should Know About Informants 361 
average juror and that such testimony would invade the role of the jury 
to determine credibility of the witness.128 
The court began its analysis by citing State v. Arroyo, in which 
the court recognized the inherent unreliability of informant testimony 
and its contribution to wrongful convictions.129 The Arroyo court 
provided instructions to the jury to review the informant testimony, as 
well as evidence that corroborated this testimony, with greater scrutiny 
and care.130 As the court then observed in Leniart, jurors may not have 
a clear understanding of the workings of the criminal justice system 
and specifically what the culture is like in jail.131 Further studies have 
indicated that jury instructions are not effective even when jurors are 
cautioned about the credibility issues and made aware of the 
informant’s possible motivation.132 Furthermore, most jury 
instructions usually occur at the end of trial, and at this point, jurors 
have made up their minds.133  
The court, in looking at the need for experts, said that “[t]he true 
test for the admissibility of expert testimony is whether the witnesses 
offered as experts have any peculiar knowledge or experience, not 
common to the world, which renders their opinions founded on such 
knowledge or experience any aid to the court or the jury in determining 
the question at issue” in this particular case, jailhouse informants.134 In 
stating this proposition, the court cautioned that the expert can invade 
the province of the jury by rendering a credibility opinion of a 
witness.135 The Leniart court concluded that the expert testimony 
 
 128. See id. 
 129. See id. at 1072 (citing State v. Arroyo, 973 A.2d 1254 (Conn. 2009)). 
 130. See id. 
 131. See id. at 1074; see also supra notes 107–117 and accompanying text 
(discussing the inadequacies of jury instructions). 
 132. See, e.g., ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS 
AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 78 (2009); see also Jeffrey S. Neuschatz et 
al., The Effects of Accomplice Witnesses and Jailhouse Informants on Jury Decision 
Making, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 137 (2008) [hereinafter The Effects of Accomplice 
Witnesses and Jailhouse Informants on Jury Decision Making] (describing a study 
wherein the group of jurors who were told that the informant was testifying in 
exchange for a benefit convicted at the approximately the same rate as the control 
group that did not receive that information). 
 133. See RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INTERFERENCE: STRATEGIES 
AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGEMENT 172 (1980) (“First impressions are 
important, and the primary effect in impression formation, in which early-presented 
information has an undue influence on final judgment . . . .”) (emphasis removed). 
 134. Leniart, 140 A.3d at 1075. 
 135. See id. at 1076. 
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would have aided the jury in this case and thus remanded the case for 
a new trial.136 
In extending the need for experts for informants, the court cited 
State v. Guilbert, a case involving an eyewitness identification expert 
where the court held that an expert can assist the jury in learning about 
factors that generally have an adverse effect on the reliability of an 
eyewitness identification.137 Although this case recognized the value 
of experts, the court found that the expert testimony would not be 
helpful because the eyewitness knew the defendant and was thus less 
likely to render a mistaken identification.138  
The Federal District Court in United States v. Noze had occasion 
to consider the Leniart decision.139 The court cited the Second Circuit 
in Nimely v. New York for the proposition that it is the jury that 
determines credibility using “their natural intelligence and their 
practical knowledge.”140 In Nimely, the expert testimony involved 
information about the propensity of police officers to lie, which goes 
to the ultimate issue of credibility, as opposed to factors that should 
be determined in weighing the credibility of a particular witness.141 
Unlike the experts in Nimely, using experts in regard to accomplices 
or jailhouse informants will not go to the ultimate issue of credibility 
of a particular witness (i.e., propensity to lie); it will only make the 
jury aware of factors it should consider in determining credibility. 
There is a great deal more to these factors than simply that jails are a 
“miserable place.”142 The court in Noze seemed to rely on cooperating 
agreements prevalent in the federal system that indicated the nature of 
the deal to testify.143 However, the deal is often not promulgated until 
after the testimony, so the informant will likely say that he is testifying 
out of a civic responsibility and not for any personal gain. Further, he 
will likely say that the prosecutor told him to tell the truth.144 
 
 136. See id. at 1079–80. 
 137. See State v. Guilbert, 49 A.3d 705, 734–37 (Conn. 2012). 
 138. See id.  
 139. See United States v. Noze, 255 F. Supp. 3d 352, 354 (D. Conn. 2017). 
 140. Nimely v. New York, 414 F.3d 381, 397 (2d. Cir. 2005). 
 141. See id. 
 142. Noze, 255 F. Supp. 3d at 354. 
 143. See id. 
 144. See generally GARRETT, supra note 61, at ch. 9. 
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C. Alternate Approaches to Test the Credibility of Informants 
There have been a number of efforts by courts and legislatures 
to deal with the problem of false testimony by informants. The most 
common methods have been jury instructions and the need for 
corroboration.145 There have been jury instructions with regard to 
accomplices and jailhouse informants.146 The jury instructions usually 
include a caution to weigh informant testimony with particular 
scrutiny and greater care than the testimony of an ordinary witness.147 
In addition, the jury is asked to consider the amount of independent 
corroboration of the informant’s testimony; the specificity of the 
testimony; the extent to which the testimony discloses details only the 
defendant knows; the extent to which the details of the testimony 
could be obtained from a source other than the defendant; the 
informant’s criminal record and his previous experience as an 
informant; any benefits received in exchange for the testimony; 
whether the informant has previously provided reliable or unreliable 
information; and the circumstances under which the informant 
initially provided the information to the police or the prosecutor.148  
The ABA and many state statutes adopted the mandatory 
corroboration requirement.149 It should be pointed out that 
corroboration evidence connecting the accused to a crime is often 
 
 145. See, e.g., State v. Arroyo, 973 A.2d 1254, 1262 (Conn. 2009). 
 146. Most states resort to jury instructions to deal with the problems with 
informant testimony. See Carlson & Russo, supra note 111, at 91. In studies of 
eyewitness identification, jury instructions did not necessarily increase the jurors’ 
sensitivity to the problem associated with eyewitness identification. See, e.g., id. See 
generally Gabriella Ramirez et al., Judges’ Cautionary Instructions on Eyewitness 
Testimony, 14 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 31 (1996).  
 147. See, e.g., Arroyo, 973 A.2d at 1262 (Conn. 2009) (requiring higher 
scrutiny for accomplice witnesses). See also Peter P. Handy, Chapter 153: Jailhouse 
Informants’ Testimony Gets Scrutiny Commensurate with its Reliability, 43 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 517, 755 (2012) (describing higher scrutiny requirement with 
accomplice witness testimony). 
 148. See Arroyo, 973 A.2d at 1262 (listing additional considerations the jury 
is instructed to weigh). 
 149. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.020 (2018); CAL. PENAL CODE § 
111 (Deering 2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-14-8 (2018); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 60.22 
(McKinney 2018). See also Covey, supra note 107, at 1416–17 n.308–11 (describing 
how the evidentiary standard is not difficult to meet because there is usually ample 
evidence of corroboration); Handy, supra note 147; Roth, supra note 42, at 743–44.  
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minimal.150 Other reforms include pretrial reliability hearings,151 in 
which a judge evaluates the evidence and may exclude evidence not 
determined to be reliable by a preponderance of the evidence.152 
Exculpatory disclosures are also required, which include existing or 
future consideration for testimony; frequency and locations of 
interviews, including any transcripts; an informant’s criminal records 
and number of times used as an informant; and how the informant 
came to the attention of the government.153 Some have suggested 
greater internal controls of ethical behavior within the prosecutor’s 
office.154 So, with regard to further reforms, efforts should be made to 
exercise greater control over creating and developing an informant.155 
One example of doing so would be a stringent procedure for recording 
interviews by police and prosecutors. This would be similar to the 
movement in eyewitness identification, which has created police 
procedures for conducting pretrial eyewitness identification. With 
regard to eyewitness cases,156 police protocols to be followed by the 
police and district attorneys have been established in order to make 
and maintain a record of all interactions with the informant.157 These 
protocols are also a fundamental concern for informant testimony. 
 
 150. See Roth, supra note 42, at 761. Additionally, the corroboration evidence 
may be unreliable. See id. In several DNA exoneration cases involving informant 
testimony, the corroboration evidence was suspect (e.g., false confessions, eyewitness 
misidentification, and faulty forensic science). See id.  
 151. See Dodd v. State, 993 P.2d 778, 784 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000).  
 152. See Ryan, supra note 73, at 122; see also John O’Connor, Illinois Adopts 
the Nation’s Toughest Test for Snitch Testimony, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 8, 2018), 
https://www.apnews.com/5a41098570fa40d2b08f96680bae866e 
[https://perma.cc/V2CC-M72R] (discussing the use of pretrial reliability hearings in 
Illinois). Illinois recently amended its Code of Criminal Procedure. See 725 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. § 5/115-21(d) (2019) (“The court shall conduct a hearing to determine 
whether the testimony of the informant is reliable, unless the defendant waives such 
a hearing. If the prosecution fails to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
informant’s testimony is reliable, the court shall not allow the testimony to be heard 
at trial.”).  
 153. See § 5/114-13(b) (providing exculpatory disclosure requirements in 
criminal cases). 
 154. See Raeder, supra note 1, at 1417.  
 155. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE 1989–90 LOS ANGELES COUNTY GRAND JURY: 
INVESTIGATION OF THE INVOLVEMENT OF JAIL HOUSE INFORMANTS IN THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY 149–50 (1990) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE 
1989–90 LOS ANGELES COUNTY GRAND JURY]. 
 156. See, e.g., State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011); State v. Lawson, 
291 P.3d 673 (Or. 2012). 
 157. See REPORT OF THE 1989–90 LOS ANGELES COUNTY GRAND JURY, supra 
note 155; see also Handy, supra note 147, at 760; Joy, supra note 88. 
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Certainly, all of these approaches are useful, but the one 
safeguard which needs to become more prevalent is the use of expert 
testimony. The last few years have witnessed an evolution of the 
acceptance of expert testimony regarding eyewitness identifications. 
Some have even suggested that a confession, even if it is coming from 
a secondary source, has a greater effect on influencing jurors than 
eyewitness testimony.158 
D. The Argument for Expert Witnesses for Informant Testimony 
Never has it been more true . . . that a criminal charged with a serious crime 
understands that a fast and easy way out of trouble with the law is . . . to cut 
a deal at someone else’s expense and to purchase leniency from the 
government by offering testimony in return for immunity, or in return for 
reduced incarceration.159  
Often, testifying is the only way to avoid long prison 
sentences.160 One court noted that it is obvious that a promise of 
reduced time is a strong incentive to falsify statements.161 Those 
already incarcerated or facing incarceration have a great incentive to 
testify falsely.162 Jurors tend to give great weight to secondary 
confessions, or confessions the informant claims the defendant 
made.163  
1. What Would an Expert Say? 
So it is a fair question to posit—what information can an expert 
provide to the jury to aid in the determination of credibility? The 
 
 158. See, e.g., Saul M. Kassin & Katherine Neuman, On 
the Power of Confession Evidence: An Experimental Test of the Fundamental 
Difference Hypothesis, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 469 (1997); Wetmore, supra note 76; 
Robert McCoppin, High Court Opens Door to Experts Who Say Eyewitness IDs Are 
Unreliable, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Sept. 12, 2016, 6:10 AM), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-eyewitness-expert-testimony-illinois-met-
20160911-story.html.  
 159. N. Mariana Islands v. Bowie, 243 F.3d 1109, 1123 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 160. See Jack Call, Judicial Control of Jailhouse Snitches, 22 JUST. SYS. J. 73, 
74 (2001). 
 161. See United States v. Meinster, 619 F.2d 1041, 1045 (4th Cir. 1980). 
 162. See Call, supra note 160, at 73–74. 
 163. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
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Connecticut Appellate Court in Leniart characterized it as the 
workings of the criminal justice system.164 
a. Benefits  
In considering the benefits, it is important to be aware that jails 
and prisons are awful places. It is hard to imagine a greater incentive 
to get out of jail and reduce one’s time in prison.165 In most instances, 
the benefits for testifying are not realized until after the testimony has 
been given. In this way, an informant on the witness stand can 
truthfully testify that there were no promises or benefits given in return 
for his testimony. This contributes to making the witness more 
convincing. However, benefits are indeed expected, and are realized, 
depending upon the helpfulness of the testimony.166 In addition, the 
informant is aware that the benefits to be received will be based on the 
usefulness of his testimony on behalf of the state’s case. Federal 
prosecutors, who are required to provide the defense with information 
as to promises, rewards, or inducements for a witness’s testimony, will 
often withhold these promises or refer to them in a vague manner to 
avoid disclosure.167  
In 1972, in Giglio v. United States, a witness falsely provided on 
cross-examination that there were no promises made in exchange for 
his testimony.168 The Supreme Court held that the prosecution’s failure 
to disclose a promise of leniency to the witness was a material issue 
 
 164. See State v. Leniart, 140 A.3d 1026, 1072 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016) (“[T]he 
extensive use of jailhouse informants in criminal prosecutions . . . [was] ‘largely a 
closeted aspect of the criminal justice system.’”). 
 165. See generally United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 
1987). See also FRED KAUFMAN, 1 COMMISSION ON PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING GUY 
PAUL MORIN: REPORT 13 (Ottawa: Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, 1998); 
Christopher Sherrin, Declarations of Innocence, 35 QUEEN’S L.J. 437, 462 (2010) 
(commenting on the Commission of Inquiry into proceedings Guy Paul Morin). 
 166. See generally BLOOM, supra note 53. 
 167. See, e.g., Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 150–53 (1972).  
 168. See id. Giglio was sentenced to five years in prison for passing forged 
money orders. See id. at 150. At trial, Robert Taliento, Giglio’s alleged coconspirator 
testified against Giglio as the only witness linking Giglio to the crime. See id. at 151. 
Giglio’s defense attorney attempted to elicit testimony from Taliento that a deal was 
made whereby Giglio would testify in exchange for leniency. See id. However, 
Taliento denied any deal and the jury heard that “[Taliento] received no promises that 
he would not be indicted.” Id. at 152. After this trial, evidence was brought to light 
that “Taliento would definitely be prosecuted if he did not testify” against Giglio. Id. 
at 153. 
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affecting the witness’s credibility.169 Nevertheless, numerous cases 
interpreting Giglio have read the decision narrowly so as to require 
disclosures only for express agreements. In this way, an informant 
witness can say that no promises were made for his or her testimony.170 
Even when there are cooperative agreements, the U.S. Attorney will 
condition recommendations on substantial assistance (vague term).171 
So much is left to be determined at a later date.172 
Even if the benefits are specifically known and presented to the 
jury, Professor Garrett, in studying the first 250 DNA exonerations, 
found that of the twenty-eight jailhouse informants, only two of them 
admitted that they had a deal with the prosecutor, while the others 
denied any explicit promise.173 “Informants rarely admitted that they 
were testifying because they hoped for some gain. Instead these 
informants often gave high-minded motives for testifying that belied 
their likely motives. Some informants claimed they were testifying as 
public-minded citizens.”174 
“[T]he jury not knowing the system of how it works is going to 
believe [me] when I get up there with all these details and facts that 
this guy sat in the jail cell, or he sat on the bus [transporting to court], 
or he sat in the holding tank somewhere or told me through a door or 
something, they’re going to believe me.”175 Further, jurors have been 
shown to be ineffective in evaluating reliability because they do not 
 
 169. See id. at 155. (deciding ultimately to issue a new trial). 
 170. See Michael Cassidy, “Soft Words of Hope”: Giglio, Accomplice 
Witnesses, and the Problem of Implied Inducements, 98 NW. L. REV. 1129, 1138 n.52 
(2004).  
 171. See id. 
 172. See Roth, supra note 42, at 755 n.90–91, 756 n.98; see also Sandra 
Guerra Thompson, Judicial Gatekeeping of Police-Generated Witness Testimony, 102 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 329, 336 (2012) [hereinafter Judicial Gatekeeping of 
Police-Generated Witness Testimony] (noting that “jurors . . . [are] generally 
ineffective at evaluating the reliability of police informants because they do not 
appreciate the government incentives or coercion . . . nor do they appreciate the 
vulnerability of some informants in the face of police pressure”). 
 173. See GARRETT, supra note 61, at 138.  
 174. Id. Juries give great weight to testimony of accomplices even when they 
are aware that the accomplice has benefited from the testimony. See The Effects of 
Accomplice Witnesses and Jailhouse Informants on Jury Decision Making, supra note 
132, at 138. 
 175. REPORT OF THE 1989–90 LOS ANGELES COUNTY GRAND JURY, supra note 
155, at 72 (stating that over the course of the investigation, the grand jury heard 120 
witnesses, including six self-professed jailhouse informants). 
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understand the government’s proffered benefits or the pressures 
exerted on the informant.176 
b. Informant Information 
Given the value of the testimony, how do informants gain this 
information if not from the perpetrator? There are many methods 
informants obtain information, such as from the streets, Internet, news, 
cell phones, and occasionally intentionally, or perhaps 
unintentionally, from investigators.177  
c. Prosecutor Information  
Often the jurors will automatically believe the prosecutor. I 
recall that when I testified in Connecticut, the prosecutor in cross-
examination would ask me, “Do you think I would knowingly put on 
a witness who is not telling the truth?” She expanded on this point by 
asking me about ethical obligations of prosecutors to seek justice.178 
 
 176. See Keith A. Findley, Judicial Gatekeeping of Suspect Evidence: Due 
Process and Evidentiary Rules in the Age of Innocence, 47 GA. L. REV. 657, 723; 
Judicial Gatekeeping of Police-Generated Witness Testimony, supra note 172, at 336.  
 177. See Raeder, supra note 1, at 1419 (noting that increasing access to 
technology has increased informants’ access to insider information). In the case of 
jailhouse informant Leslie White, Mr. White would call various precincts to get 
information about a crime, such as the date, the name and age of the victim and 
suspect, and the jail cell number. See Robert Reinhold, California Shaken Over an 
Informer, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 1989), https://www.nytimes.com/1989/02/17 
/us/california-shaken-over-an-informer.html [https://perma.cc/7UR3-W5NH]. Next, 
White would call the prosecutor on the case posing as a sergeant at the precinct to 
gain more information. See id. Mr. White said,  
At this point, I’ve got the victim’s name, date of arrest, date of occurrence, method 
of murder, facts in the case, down to detailed specific information. I would need no 
more at this time than I was somewhere near the suspect . . . [a]nd I could easily say 
this suspect had in fact made a jailhouse admission to me concerning the crime and 
explained to me he had done it this way with the facts I have at this point. I don’t 
think there’s any homicide detective in the county who would not believe what I’ve 
got to say. 
Id.; see also REPORT OF THE 1989–90 LOS ANGELES COUNTY GRAND JURY, supra note 
155. 
 178. See AM. BAR ASS’N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE 
PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.2 (4th ed. 2015) (“The primary duty of the prosecutor 
is to seek justice within the bounds of the law, not merely to convict.”); cf. AM. BAR 
ASS’N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-1.2 (4th ed. 
2015) (“The primary duties that defense counsel owe to their clients, to the 
administration of justice, and as officers of the court, are to serve as their clients’ 
counselor and advocate with courage and devotion; to ensure that constitutional and 
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She also pointed out her obligation to provide exculpatory evidence to 
the defense.179 However, prosecutors often are young and 
inexperienced and are not always good at detecting lying.180 Also, 
cultural and linguistic issues between prosecutors and informants 
often make the assessment of truth difficult.181 In addition, there are 
rarely consequences to the prosecutor for putting on false testimony.182 
Prosecutors will often use informants so as to shore up an 
otherwise weak case.183 One of the aspects that an expert would testify 
to is the amount of discretion afforded to prosecutors.184 Prosecutors 
and investigators have wide latitude in developing informant 
testimony.185 Prosecutors often decide in crimes involving more than 
one perpetrator who shall help the state prove its case and receive 
benefits and who shall experience the brunt of the punishment.186 This 
discretion may be exercised randomly, for example, depending on 
who is the first to turn the state’s evidence or who is the first to have 
gotten caught. There is virtually no monitoring of this process. Roth 
 
other legal rights of their clients are protected; and to render effective, high-quality 
legal representation with integrity.”); see also John C. Brigham & Melissa P. 
WolfsKeil, Opinions of Attorneys and Law Enforcement Personnel on the Accuracy 
of Eyewitness Identifications, 7 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 337, 346–47 (1983) (finding that 
prosecutors “regard eyewitness identification as relatively accurate and feel that its 
importance is appropriately emphasized by judges and jurors,” while “defense 
attorneys . . . [feel] that eyewitness identifications are often inaccurate and 
overemphasized by triers of fact”).  
 179. See generally Brady v. Maryland, 371 U.S. 812 (1962). 
 180. Kassin, infra note 190; Roth, supra note 42, at 774–75. 
 181. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: 
Experiences of Truth Telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 948 
(1999) (noting that prosecutors do not look critically enough at the reliability of the 
statement because they believe they have the right person and are looking for 
corroboration). 
 182. See Raeder, supra note 1, at 1425 (citing the Chicago Tribune analysis of 
381 murder cases that were reversed for prosecution misconduct). However, none of 
the prosecutors were disbarred. See id.  
 183. See generally Secondary Confessions, Expert Testimony, and Unreliable 
Testimony, supra note 75. Additionally, in cases with weak evidence, the situational 
incentives of law enforcement agents and accomplices align to create the greatest 
opportunity for false testimony. Id. 
 184. See Covey, supra note 107, at 1415. 
 185. See id. at 1383; see also Findley, supra note 176, at 754 n.109 (quoting 
the Canadian inquiry into the wrongful conviction of Thomas Sophonow, noting that 
“jailhouse informants are ‘polished and convincing liars’”). See generally PETER DE 
C. CORY, THE INQUIRY REGARDING THOMAS SOPHONOW: THE INVESTIGATION, 
PROSECUTION AND CONSIDERATION OF ENTITLEMENT TO COMPENSATION (Winnipeg: 
Manitoba Justice, 2001) [hereinafter Sophonow Inquiry]. 
 186. See Covey, supra note 107, at 1388. 
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coined the phrase “The Black Box Aspect of Informant Use” to 
emphasize the lack of controls regarding how informant testimony is 
developed and gathered and how it is introduced at trial.187 Thus, an 
informant may gain information that contributes to his or her 
credibility either deliberately or mistakenly by police or prosecutor.188  
Jurors tend to believe in prosecutors who are working for the 
“people” and would thus not put anyone on the stand that they thought 
was not truthful. To this end, jurors should be aware of two factors—
first, jurors should know that prosecutors are not better at discovering 
truth than an average citizen, and secondly there is an adversarial 
process going on in the courtroom where sometimes prosecutors are 
blinded by their desire to win.189 Not to mention, prosecutors, even 
honest ones, sometimes fall prey to cognitive failures. Studies have 
shown that prosecutors are no more reliable than a lay person in 
detecting lying.190 Furthermore, prosecutors are prone to confirmation 
 
 187. Roth, supra note 42, at 756. 
 188. See id. at 755; see also BLOOM, supra note 53, at 65 (describing the story 
of Leslie Vernon White); REPORT OF THE 1989–90 LOS ANGELES COUNTY GRAND 
JURY, supra note 155, at 1; Sophonow Inquiry, supra note 185. 
 189. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 181, at 952. See generally Steven M. 
Cohen, What Is True? Perspectives of A Former Prosecutor, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 
817 (2002). 
 190. See Saul M. Kassin, Human Judges of Truth, Deception, and Credibility: 
Confident but Erroneous, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 809, 811 (2002); see also Roth, supra 
note 42, at 774. Prosecutors are not necessarily more apt to detect deceptions than 
average citizens. Additionally, prosecutors are prone to confirmation bias, as the 
informant version is often consistent with their own theory. Thus, they tend to be less 
skeptical of informant testimony. See Covey, supra note 107, at 1384–85; see also 
Yaroshefsky, supra note 181. 
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bias.191 Because the informant’s version is consistent with their own 
theory of the case, they are less skeptical of any gaps in the narrative.192  
With regard to accomplices, the old adage “it takes a crook to 
catch a crook” is applicable. Accomplices usually have pled guilty and 
are awaiting sentencing and thus choose to testify so they can 
minimize their own role in the enterprise and implicate others as the 
masterminds.193 Furthermore, this testimony is highly believable to 
jurors because an accomplice is admitting wrongdoing.194 
“[P]sychological profile of accomplice witnesses suggests that they 
may be more likely than ordinary witnesses to perjure themselves 
because, by their own admission, most have committed crimes, 
thereby demonstrating a tendency to disregard legal norms.”195 
As the New York Times recently observed, “[M]any prosecutors 
are far too willing to present testimony from people they would never 
trust under ordinary circumstances. Until prosecutors are more 
concerned with doing justice than with winning convictions, even the 
 
 191. See JAMES COMEY, A HIGHER LOYALTY: TRUTH, LIES, AND LEADERSHIP 
104 (2018) (“Our brains have evolved to crave information consistent with what we 
already believe. We seek out and focus on facts and arguments that support our 
beliefs. More worrisome, when we are trapped in confirmation bias, we may not 
consciously perceive facts that challenge us, that are inconsistent with what we have 
already concluded. In a complicated, changing, and integrated world, our 
confirmation bias makes us very different people. We simply can’t change our 
minds.”); see also George Thomas III, Blinded by the Light: A Review of Mark 
Godsey’s Blind Injustice, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 597, 604 (2018) (“Once police 
officers or detectives have a theory of the case, and a suspect, they tend to see every 
piece of evidence as confirming their theory. It is this way the brain is wired. Pieces 
of evidence that go against the original theory are often rejected; that evidence is 
unreliable or the witness mistaken. Prosecutors who get a case file with a theory and 
a suspect suffer the same confirmation bias.”).  
 192. See United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530, 536 (1980) (explaining how 
prosecutors by putting witness on stand appear to be vouching for their testimony, yet 
studies show prosecutors not the best in detecting perjury); see also Alafair S. 
Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive 
Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1596–97 (2006) (noting that people tend to 
view information that reinforces their existing beliefs favorably). 
 193. See Christine J. Saverda, Accomplices in Federal Court: A Case for 
Increased Evidentiary Standards, 100 YALE L.J. 785, 786 (1990). 
 194. See id. at 787.  
 195. Cassidy, supra note 170, at n.66; Paul C. Gianelli, Brady and Jailhouse 
Snitches, 57 CASE W. RES. 593, 610 n.53 (2007) (noting because of truthfulness 
concerns, eighteen states have statutes requiring corroboration of accomplice 
testimony); see also Roth, supra note 42, at 765–66 n.153 (noting that accomplices 
may admit to participating in a crime but minimize their own involvement while 
inflating the roles of others, and some may admit guilt but fabricate the involvement 
of others). 
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most well-intentioned laws will fall short.”196 Given DNA 
exonerations, the possibility that the informant testimony is not 
truthful should be obvious to prosecutors.197 
2. Possible Consequences to Informant for Lying 
One might think that perjury prosecutions might exist for lying. 
However, as the L.A. grand jury discovered, there are almost never 
such prosecutions.198 We have previously discussed the importance of 
the informant to the criminal justice system.199 If perjury prosecutions 
became prevalent, informants might be deterred from testifying.200 
Additionally, perjury prosecutions are difficult to prove.201 
Another consequence is the threat of violence on the streets or in 
the prison system for being an informant.202 If the informant does not 
get released as a result of providing testimony, he could be transferred 
within the system.203 Conversely, if the informant is released and there 
is a significant likelihood of violence, he might be offered a witness 
protection program.204 
CONCLUSION 
DNA exonerations have established that some informants lie.205 
Recognizing the need for informants in the prosecution of crimes, 
 
 196. Robert S. Mosteller, Prosecutorial Discretion: The Special Threat of 
Informants to the Innocent Who Are Not Innocents: Producing “First Drafts,” 
Recording Incentives, and Taking a Fresh Look at the Evidence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 519, 519 (proposing a review of prosecutorial decision-making in cases where 
informant testimony is critical to the outcome). See Raeder, supra note 1, at 1417 
(discussing the potential ethical violations of prosecutors when they offer informant 
testimony, knowing there might be a high probability that the testimony is false); 
Texas Cracks Down on the Market For Jailhouse Snitches, supra note 38. 
 197. See Raeder, supra note 1, at 1413. 
 198. See REPORT OF THE 1989–90 LOS ANGELES COUNTY GRAND JURY, supra 
note 155. 
 199. See Roth, supra note 42, at 765. 
 200. See Mark Curriden, The Lies Have It: Judges Maintain that Perjury is on 
the Rise but the Court System May Not Have Enough Resources to Stem the Tide, 81 
A.B.A. J. 68, 69 (1995). 
 201. See id. (citing Michael McCann, a Milwaukee County prosecutor, 
describing a growing prevalence of perjury: “Outside of income evasion, perjury is 
probably the most under prosecuted crime in America.”). 
 202. See BLOOM, supra note 53, at 63. 
 203. See id. 
 204. See id. 
 205. See Raeder, supra note 1, at 1413. 
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safeguards need to be implemented to ensure the truthfulness of 
informant testimony.206 The use of expert witnesses has evolved in 
eyewitness cases to assist the jury in its evaluation of the credibility of 
a witness.207 It is the hope that experts will be utilized more readily 
when dealing with an informant witness.  
 
 206. See Mosteller, supra note 196, at 519. 
 207. See Vallas, supra note 84, at 114.  
